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Abstract. The current intrusion detection systems have a number of problems 
that limit their configurability, scalability and efficiency. There have been some 
propositions about distributed architectures based on multiple independent 
agents working collectively for intrusion detection. However, these distributed 
intrusion detection systems are not fully distributed as most of them centrally 
analyze data collected from distributed nodes which may lead to a single point 
of failure. In this paper, a distributed intrusion detection architecture is 
presented that is based on autonomous and cooperating agents without any 
centralized analysis components. The agents cooperate by using a hierarchical 
communication of interests and data, and the analysis of intrusion data is made 
by the agents at the lowest level of the hierarchy. This architecture provides 
significant advantages in scalability, flexibility, extensibility, fault tolerance, 
and resistance to compromise. A proof-of-concept prototype is developed and 
experiments have been conducted on it. The results show the effectiveness of 
the system in detecting intrusive activities.  
Keywords: Distributed intrusion detection, agents, multi-agent systems, Java 
agent development environment (JADE). 
1   Introduction 
 A secure computer system provides guarantees regarding the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of its objects (such as data, purpose, or services). However, 
systems generally contain design and implementation flaws that result in security 
vulnerabilities. An intrusion can take place when an attacker or a group of attackers 
exploits the vulnerabilities and thus damages the confidentiality, integrity or 
availability guarantees of a system. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) detect some 
set of intrusions and execute some predetermined actions when an intrusion is 
detected. 
Over the last one and half decade, research in the field of intrusion detection has 
been heading towards a distributed framework of systems that do local detection and 
provide information to perform global detection of intrusions. These distributed 
frameworks of intrusion detection have some advantages over single monolithic 
frameworks. Most of these distributed systems are hierarchical in nature. The local 
intrusion detection components look for local intrusions and pass their analysis results 
to the upper levels of the hierarchy. The components at the upper levels analyze the 
refined data from multiple lower level components and attempt to establish a global 
view of the system state. However, such IDSs are not fully distributed systems 
because of the centralized data analysis performed at the higher levels of the hierarchy 
[1]. In this paper, an agent-based architecture is proposed for performing intrusion 
detection in a distributed environment. By employing a suitable communication 
mechanism, the resource overhead is minimized in the distributed intrusion detection 
process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes some related 
works done on distributed intrusion detection and their shortcomings, Section 3 
briefly introduces the concept of agents and their properties, Section 4 describes the 
details of the functional architecture of the proposed system, Section 5 gives some 
details of implementation and experimental results conducted on the system, and 
finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2   Related Work 
In this section, some of the existing distributed IDS frameworks are discussed briefly. 
DIDS [2] is a distributed intrusion detection system consisting of host managers and 
LAN managers doing distributed data monitoring, and sending notable events to the 
DIDS director. These managers also do some local detection, passing the summaries 
to the director. The director analyzes the events to determine the security state.  
AAFID [3] is a distributed IDS developed in CERIAS at Purdue University. It 
employs agents at the lowest level of the hierarchy for data collection and analysis 
and transceivers and monitors at the higher levels for controlling agents and obtaining 
a global view of activities. It provides a subscription-based service to the agents. 
A prototype called the Hummingbird System [4] is developed at University of 
Idaho. It is a distributed system that employs a set of Hummer agents, each assigned 
to a single host or a set of hosts. Each Hummer interacts with other hummers in the 
system through a manager, a subordinate, and the peer relationships. It enables a 
system administrator to monitor security threats on multiple computers. 
An architecture of an intrusion detection system using a collection of autonomous 
agents has been proposed in [2]. In cooperation and communication model proposed 
by the authors, agents request and receive information solely on the basis of their 
interests. They can specify new interests as a result of a new event or alert. This 
avoids unnecessary data flow among the agents.   
However, most of these intrusion detection systems have the following drawbacks:  
(i) Analysis hierarchy: as there is a hierarchy in data analysis these systems are 
very difficult to modify. Changes may have to be made at many levels if any new 
distributed attack is developed. 
(ii) Data refinement: when a module from a lower level sends results of analysis to 
a higher level, some data refinement is done. However, the knowledge of what events 
are important in a system-wide level is difficult to anticipate at the lower levels of the 
hierarchy, and thus data refinement may result in loss of important information. 
(iii) Bulky modules: intrusion analysis engines based on anomaly detection are 
usually very large modules. They also consume significant amount of system 
resources in terms of CPU usage, disk I/O, and memory, as they have to analyze long 
audit trails. In most of the systems described above, these components are present at 
all levels. They also present multiple points of failures. 
(iv) Passive interactions: the components of these IDSs interact with each other in 
a passive way. The lower level components generate data for the upper level 
components as per the rules driving them. There is no mechanism for a component to 
query other component on the basis of some analysis that it has done.   
To overcome the above problems, an intrusion detection architecture is proposed in 
this paper that is based on the coordination among a set of agents. The key effort in 
the proposed approach is directed towards making the agents intelligently cooperate 
by communicating actively with each other. The intelligence in cooperation is 
attempted by communicating events and alerts to only those agents that are interested 
in those events and alerts. The details of the system are discussed in Section 4. 
3 Agents and Agent-Registries 
As discussed Section 1, the proposed system consists of a number of cooperating 
agents. In this section, the properties of the agents are discussed in brief for an easy 
understanding of the system architecture. 
Crossbie and Spafford [5] first pointed out the suitability of autonomous and 
intelligent agents in intrusion detection applications. They have defined an agent as a 
computational or physical entity situated in an environment (either real or virtual), 
which is able to act in the environment, to perceive and partially represent its 
environment, and to communicate with other agents. An agent is also driven by 
internal tendencies (goals, beliefs etc.) and has an autonomous behavior, which is the 
consequence of its perception, its representation and its interactions with the 
environment and with other agents. An agent can be described by a set of properties 
[6]. The ability of an agent to operate without direct intervention of humans or other 
agents is known as its autonomy property. The capability of an agent to integrate itself 
in a large environment populated by a society of agents with which it has to exchange 
messages to achieve purposeful actions is called sociability property. The ability of an 
agent to anticipate situations and change its course of action is called proactivity 
property of an agent. Reactivity is that property of an agent due to which it reacts in 
real-time to changes that occur in its environment. Adaptability is the ability of an 
agent to modify its behavior over time to fulfill its problem-solving goals.  
Interests: an interest is defined as “a specification of data that an agent is interested 
in, but is not available to it because of the locality of data collection or because it was 
not primarily intended to observe those data.” [2]. Following cases may be 
considered:  
(1) There may be more than one agents residing on the same host that need data 
from the same data source. Having each agent obtain its data on its own will lead to 
duplication of effort in terms of accessing the data. Therefore, if the overhead of the 
data access mechanism from the data source is more than the communication 
overhead of transferring the data between the agents, it will be more efficient if one 
agent obtains the data and makes it available to the other agents. 
(2) When an agent detects coordinated or distributed attacks, it may need data from 
agents residing in multiple hosts. The agent may not have access to the data sources in 
this case and transfer of data from other agents is the only solution. It is impossible 
for an agent to keep track of all other agents in a large network. Thus an agent may 
not know the existence or locations of agents those are collecting data in which it may 
have interest. Hence propagation of interests of different agents in the network 
becomes essential.  The agents may have different types of interest: 
Directed and propagated interests: an agent knows the host or domain from which 
it is interested in getting data. If the agent has no specific idea about the source, the 
interest is propagated across the entire enterprise network. Such an interest is termed 
as a propagated interest. 
(2) Local-, domain- and enterprise-level interests: an interest can be a local-level, a 
domain-level, or an enterprise-level interest depending on whether it is interested in 
getting data only from a local host, local domain, or the entire enterprise network. The 
data that is requested by an agent in the form of an interest is delivered to it by the 
agents(s) servicing that interest. In the proposed scheme, data delivery among agents 
is suggested using the same hierarchical fashion as in propagation of interests. Direct 
data delivery without following the hierarchy is not a feasible proposition in a large 
enterprise network.  
Registries:  as Fig. 1 shows, each host maintains two registries - Agent Registry and 
Interest Registry. The agent registry maintains information about the basic agents, the 
events these agents collect, and the alerts they generate. The interest registry keeps 
track of the interests originating from the basic agents and interests being serviced. 
4   Architecture of the System 
The proposed architecture is a five-tier hierarchical structure of agents as shown in 
Fig 2. There are five types of agents are: local agents or basic agents (BAs), 
workstation coordinator agents (WCAs), domain coordinator agents (DCAs), and 
security policy manager agent (SMA). These agents are described below.  
4.1   Basic (Local) Agents 
A workstation (host) can be logically split into multiple entities each performing 
different functions. Each entity is monitored by a set of BAs. Every BA is responsible 
for monitoring a part of the system resource, user system, and so on. These agents 
collect and analyze data flowing into or out of this workstation. Every BA works 
independently and concurrently with respect to other BAs. The monitoring BA reports 
the situation detected on an entity, or gives an alarm to the local system user, or takes 
appropriate measures to prevent the perceived threat, if necessary. This is depicted in 
Fig. 3. If a BA encounters a situation where it does not have appropriate data to 
ascertain whether an intrusion is taking place, it expresses an interest in that data and 
propagates the interest to the WCA on that workstation. 
  
                                    Fig. 1. Interest and agent registries  
4.2   Workstation Coordinator Agents 
Every workstation has one WCA. The WCAs serve as links between the BAs and the 
DCAs. All WCAs residing in the adjacent hosts in the same domain have direct 
communication links between them. When a WCA receives an interest from a BA, it 
first checks the type of the interest. If the interest is a host-directed or a domain-
directed interest to a different domain, the interest is forwarded to the DCA above the 
WCA in the agent hierarchy.  If the interest is a host-directed interest in the same 
domain but towards a different host, the interest is forwarded to the appropriate WCA 
of that host. Otherwise, it refers to the agent registry and determines if there is any 
agent on this host that can service that interest. If any such agent is found, the WCA 
informs that agent to send the requested events, and also updates the interest registry 
in the local host. If no agent on the host is found that can service the interest, and if 
the interest is a local-level interest, the WCA informs the requesting agent about its 
inability to service that interest. When a WCA receives an interest from the DCA 
above or a WCA in the same domain, it looks up the agent registry to determine if 
there is any agent on the host that can service this interest. If any such agent is found, 
the WCA requests that agent to send the required data to it, and updates the interest 
registry. If no such agent is found, the WCA discards the request. When a WCA 
receives data from a BA in the same host, it looks up the interest registry and sends 
the data to the BAs whose interest matches the data received. If an agent from a 
different domain has already registered for the data, the WCA forwards the data to the 
appropriate DCA for further forwarding. When a WCA receives data from a DCA, it 
looks up the interest registry, and sends the data to all the BAs in the local host whose 
interest matches the data received. 
3.1 Domain Coordinator Agents 
Every domain has a DCA. The DCA in each domain has knowledge of all the WCAs 
in its domain and has direct communication links to each of them. Each DCA is also 
directly linked to the ECA. The main function of DCAs is to propagate interests and 
data among WCAs and BAs belonging to separate domains. An interest received by a 
DCA from the ECA can only be a propagated interest because any host-directed or 
domain-directed interests would have been taken care of by appropriate WCA or 
DCA. The propagated interest received from the ECA is sent to all hosts to which the 
DCA is connected. An interest received from a DCA of a different domain can be of 
two types: a host-directed interest to a host in this domain or a domain-directed 
interest to this domain. The interests of the first type are forwarded to the appropriate 
hosts, while those of the second type are forwarded to all the hosts in this domain. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Logical organization of agents. (Bi-directional arrows show flow of data and interest)   
 
Fig. 3. Inter-agent communication in a workstation 
An interest received from a WCA in the same domain may be of three types: a 
host-directed interest to a host in a different domain or a domain-directed interest to a 
different domain or a propagated interest. The interests of the first and second types 
are sent to the appropriate DCA for further transfer. The interests of the third type are 
forwarded to the ECA. An interest directed to a host in the same domain is forwarded 
to that host. If the directed host is not in the same domain, the DCA forwards it to the 
ECA. Similarly, a domain-directed interest is sent to all hosts in the domain if the 
domain specified is its own domain; else it is forwarded to the ECA. Domain-level 
interests are forwarded to all hosts in its domain. Enterprise-level and propagated 
interests are not only sent to all hosts in its domain but also forwarded to the ECA. 
Data received form the ECA is forwarded only to the host specified. Data received 
from a host in the domain of the DCA is sent to the DCA of that sent the interest. 
4.4   Enterprise Coordinator Agent 
The ECA is at the top of all DCAs in the agent hierarchy, monitoring all the domains 
under it. Its functionality is simpler than that of a DCA, since it only has to keep track 
of the domains under it, and forward data and interests between them.  
4.5 Security Policy Manager Agent 
The SMA manages the security policies specified by the administrator. The 
administrator interacts with the agents from a high level using security policies that 
specify the roles and responsibilities of the agents, and the behavior they should 
exhibit when they receive events or alerts. 
Secure and reliable transmission of messages is a prime requirement for operation 
of a distributed intrusion detection system. In proposed system, two different types of 
communication are identified: (i) communication among the agents at the same host, 
(ii) communication among the hosts at different hosts. The important messages 
exchanged between the agents are: (i) registration request to agent registries, (ii) 
location queries for agents, (iii) agent queries, and (iv) registry update requests. 
For agent communication in the same host, mechanisms like pipes, message 
queues, shared memory can be used for. In the proposed scheme, the shared memory 
mechanism is used since it is efficient for one-to-many communication [3]. For agents 
in different hosts, the agent management system (AMS) of JADE [7] has been used. 
This reduces the cost of communication, as the methods of communication are not 
replicated for each agent. A PKI model is implemented for providing two-way 
authentication of messages and the agents. 
5   Implementation and Experiments 
In this section, some implementation details and experimental results are presented. 
A proof-of-concept prototype has been built with JADE [7] and Java. JADE (Java 
Agent Development Environment) is a middleware developed by TILAB that enables 
faster development of multi-agent distributed applications based on the peer-to-peer 
communication architecture. JADE has been implemented fully in Java. It includes 
both the libraries (i.e. the Java classes) required to develop application agents, and the 
run-time environment that provides the basic services and that must be active on the 
host before agents can be executed. From the functional point of view, JADE provides 
all the basic services necessary for distributed peer-to-peer applications. It allows 
each agent to dynamically discover other agents and to communicate with them by 
message passing mechanism. The agents communicate by exchanging asynchronous 
messages. Each agent is identified by a unique identifier and provides a set of 
services. An agent can register its services and search for other agents. 
Implementation of the agents under JADE framework involves the following steps: 
1. Determination of the agent behavior. 
2. Implementation of the agent class (extending the existing classes of 
JADE). 
3. Implementation of agent meta-behavior by instantiating an existing class 
or introducing a new class and then instantiating it. The meta-behavior 
provides an agent with a self-control mechanism to dynamically schedule 
its behavior in accordance with its internal state. 
4. Instantiation of the agent class. 
5. Initializing the agent acquaintances. 
6. Deployment and activation of the agents. 
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Fig. 4. An illustration of the detection of an ICMP-flooding attack 
To illustatrate the cooperative framework, a scenario is described where an ICMP 
flooding attack on a web server is detected (Figure 4). In the web server of a LAN 1 
(domain 1), the basic agent 1 monitors all the ICMP requests entering the web server. 
These requests may come from either the local hosts of the same LAN1 (domain 1), 
or local hosts from different a domain, such as LAN2, or from external hosts 
anywhere in the Internet/Extranet. The basic agent 1 of the web server plays the most 
important role here, because its goal is to observe the number of ICMP requests 
received by the web server over a certain period of time, and block the access to the 
server if it finds that the number of requests exceeds a certain predetermined threshold 
specified in its rule of detection. For this purpose, the basic agent 1 collects all ICMP 
request data that arrives at the web server. It also interacts with basic agent 2 and 
basic agent 3 on some hosts located in the same domain as the web server to obtain 
their collected data (for instance, number of ping probes they collect from the hosts 
they supervise and send to the web server). The same interest request and data 
delivery can take place between the basic agent 1 and another basic agent (e.g., basic 
agent 4) on a host belonging to a different domain through their domain coordination 
agents. These events are used to update/create the beliefs of the basic agent 1. If the 
goal is reached, an alarm is raised. 
Experiments have been conducted to test the performance of the developed 
prototype. In the experiments, the KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection contest data [8] 
have been used. This data was compiled by the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection and 
evaluation program by MIT Lincoln Lab. The original database consisted of 4.94 
million records. There were 41 attributes for each record. Each record was also given 
a class label that specified the category of attack to which the record belonged. All the 
attacks were categorized in to four major categories: i) Denial of Service (DoS), ii) 
Remote to User (R2C), iii) User to Root (U2R), and iv) Probing (Probe). 
A dataset is constructed that consists of 15000 records by randomly selecting 
records from the original database, such that the number of data instances selected 
from each class was proportional to their frequency in the original database. One 
additional class of records is added what is called as the ‘normal’ class in addition to 
the 4 attack types mentioned above. The knowledge about these attacks is then 
distributed among the agents of the system. 
To test the performance of the of the prototype system that we developed we 
conducted experiments in a network of workstations each having Pentium 4 processor 
with 3GHz clock speed and 1 GB RAM. The data rate of the Ethernet was 100 Mbps. 
The agents were installed in the workstations in a hierarchical fashion. 
Using Ethereal network sniffer, the network is monitored and the bandwidth 
utilization of the agents is evaluated. First, the network is monitored with no agents 
running on any workstation so as to establish the baseline utilization. The agents are 
then activated on each workstation and simulated attacks are launched from different 
workstations into the network. From the data collected by the sniffer, it was evident 
that the agents had very little bandwidth consumption. During the one-hour time when 
the agents were active on the workstations, only 15% increase in number of packets 
captured in the network by the sniffer was compared with the one-hour period when 
the network was monitored without activating the agents. The average bandwidth 
consumption by the agents never exceeded 5% of the 100 MBPS Ethernet. 
To test the CPU utilization by the agents, some workstations are randomly selected 
and some intensive user programs are activated on them. The IDS agents are then 
invoked on these workstations, and some elementary attacks like password guessing   
are simulated. During the thirty-minute analysis period, the maximum CPU utilization 
of the agents was found to be only 8.76%, the average utilization being 0.35%. 
Finally, for testing the attack detection capability and false positive rates, 37 
different attacks are simulated from some workstations on the others. Some of attacks 
chosen those are not in the knowledge base of the agents. This is done to test the 
ability of the IDS prototype to detect novel attacks. Table 1 summarizes the results of 
the experiment. The results show that the performance of the prototype is quite 
encouraging particularly in terms of successful detection of attacks. 
Table 1.  Performance results of the prototype IDS  
Activity Type   Detection Rate False Positive Rate 
Denial of Service (DoS) 93.28% 11.42% 
Remote to User (R2U) 89.41% 16.53% 
User to Root (U2R) 85.63% 18.34% 
Probe 92.26% 14.38% 
Normal 96.30% 8.24% 
7   Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed some existing intrusion detection systems and 
illustrated their limitations. Flexibility, autonomy, adaptability, and distribution are 
the principal features to be addressed to build a suitable architecture that can be useful 
for detection of complex and distributed attacks. A prototype architecture of an 
intrusion detection system is presented, which is based on a group of agents that do 
data collection and analysis in a truly distributed manner. These interest-driven 
cooperating agents make the system more fault-tolerant. Moreover, the autonomy 
given to the agents makes the administration tasks of the security officer much easier. 
Experiments conducted on the system have produced results that show effectiveness 
of the system. 
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